August 15, 2024

By Elena McGovern, Co-Head of Capstone’s National Security Practice

A Harris administration’s national security and foreign policy positions would hew closely to Biden’s—namely support for US allies, including Ukraine against Russia, and continued de-risking policies toward China. Biden’s replacement at the top of the ticket affords Democrats an opportunity to reset with the party’s progressive wing on a major area of contention—the war in Gaza—but we expect the tone to be different but policy to remain consistent.

While a President Kamala Harris would likely have a similar approach to foreign policy and defense issues as the current Biden administration, her candidacy affords the Democratic ticket two specific advantages—a tonal reset on the war in Gaza, which could restore support among some of the more progressive Democratic voters, and a distance from the chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan, which would likely have dogged President Biden should he have stayed in the race. On the top geopolitical issues of the day, from China to the wars in Ukraine and Israel, however, we expect a continuation of generally centrist Democratic policy.

What Harris Has Said About Defense and Foreign Policy

• China: Vice President Harris has represented the White House and US policy many times, both on trips to the Indo-Pacific and at key international forums such as the 2023 US-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit and visits to the high-profile Munich Security Conference. During these visits and at other times, Vice President Harris has spoken forcefully about the need to defend US allies against perceived Chinese aggression and to defend US interests from competition with and threats from China. For example, during a 2022 visit to the Philippines, Harris promised to support the Philippines against Chinese “intimidation and coercion.”
  
  We expect US policy toward China to remain steady, ceteris paribus, from the Biden to a Harris presidency. This includes not only the aforementioned support for US allies in the Indo-Pacific but also the continued intent to balance aggressive policies to deter Chinese economic influence both domestically and globally while seeking to maintain stability geopolitically and avoid direct confrontation.
• NATO and Transatlantic Relations: At the 2024 Munich Security Conference, Vice President Harris defended the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) support for Ukraine and the importance of NATO as an alliance. Her remarks included the following: “NATO is central to our approach to global security. For President Biden and me, our sacred commitment to NATO remains ironclad. And I do believe, as I have said before, NATO is the greatest military alliance the world has ever known.”
  
  For its part, the Russian government is likely hoping that former President Trump wins the election, particularly as Capstone believes that Trump would quickly seek to resolve the conflict, including by suspending military aid to Ukraine and pressuring Kiev to the negotiating table. That said, the immediate Russian response to Kamala Harris at the top of the Democratic ticket was fairly neutral policy wise while also trying to minimize her role as a geopolitical player. Indeed, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said shortly after it became clear that she would likely be the nominee that, “At the moment, we cannot assess the potential candidacy of Ms. Harris from the point of view of our bilateral relations because so far her contribution to our bilateral relations has not been noticed…There were statements that were replete with rhetoric quite unfriendly towards our country, but her actions in relations to bilateral relations come under neither a plus nor a minus sign.”
  
  We expect a President Harris to maintain US commitments to NATO and seek to strengthen NATO and broader transatlantic ties, particularly should the war in Ukraine extend for a significant period into the next administration. We expect her to remain critical of Russian President Vladimir Putin and seek to push back against attempts to make further gains, both militarily and politically, into Europe.

Where Harris Differs from Biden

• Creating rhetorical distance on the war in Gaza: One area where we have already observed presidential candidate Harris seek to create daylight between her and the Biden administration has been on the war in Gaza and US policy towards Israel. In addition to likely genuine concern for both Palestinians and Israelis killed, injured, and displaced by the conflict since October 7, 2023, because Harris herself is not closely associated with US-Israel policy, there is a political opportunity to try to bring progressive Democrats frustrated with President Biden on this issue back onside before the election.
  
  For example, Harris used Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington as an opportunity to let her criticism of how Israel has pursued the war in Gaza be known. In addition to joining many members of the Democratic party and not attending Netanyahu’s speech to Congress on July 24^th, she also made a carefully parsed statement after meeting with him the following day. Among her comments included, “I’ve said it many times, but it bears repeating: Israel has a right to defend itself, but how it does so matters.”
  
  To be sure, we believe that a Harris presidency would not actually pursue a different policy towards Israel, particularly in terms of support for Israeli defense and national security, including the sale of key weapons. However, heading into the election and likely should she win the presidency, Kamala Harris may take a harder approach with Israel as it relates to the war in Gaza and may be more willing to criticize the government over the conditions facing Palestinians.

Key Priorities for any Democratic Administration

• Challenging Chinese economic competition globally: We expect a Harris administration to build on the efforts of the Biden administration to push back against China’s Belt and Road initiative, which has given the country considerable economic footholds and as a result political influence in a lot of the developing world. One example is the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI)—the G7 initiative in low- and middle-income countries. We also expect a Harris administration to continue on the path of the Biden administration in terms of using executive action to continue the process of “de-risking” the US economy, including through the continued implementation—and potentially even the expansion of—outbound investment restrictions. Export controls, sanctions and other tools will also continue to be expanded to address the risks of Chinese dominance in areas of critical and emerging technology.
• Defending Ukraine, Strengthening NATO: Democrats remain committed to the defense of Ukraine. This is not only to support Ukrainian sovereignty but also for several geopolitical reasons. First, Democrats hold the fervent belief that stopping Russian aggression in Ukraine is essential for European security. As NATO member countries increase their defense spending, a Harris administration would likely continue strengthening NATO’s defense modernization and integration. Second, they also recognize that standing up for the defense democratic states against invasion represents essential element of deterrence against potential Chinese action against Taiwan. Therefore, for many reasons, a Harris administration will remain committed to Ukraine’s defense. At the same time, it will also continue to seek stability between the US and Russia, and avoid unwanted escalation between the two countries.
• Negotiating a US-Saudi defense treaty: We would expect a Harris administration to continue the Biden administration’s efforts of negotiating a US-Saudi defense treaty, which as a part of any agreement would likely include the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations and a promise on progress toward a two-state solution for the Palestinians. The specifics if the agreement include several highly sensitive and historic agreements—namely a US security guarantee for Saudi Arabia comparable to the “Article 5” commitment enjoyed by NATO members, as well as the decision on assist the kingdom in its development of a civil nuclear energy program. In exchange, Saudi Arabia would commit to limiting its defense and technological relationship with China.
  
  A US-Saudi defense treaty would require ratification by the US Senate, which should not be automatically expected under most electoral scenarios, as at least some Democratic opposition is expected based on criticism of Saudi Arabia, and a two-thirds majority is required for it to pass. Senators from both sides of the aisle may also have concerns about the Article 5-like commitment to Saudi security, particularly as the Republican party is increasingly isolationist, among other issues (e.g. the nonproliferation risks associated with the civil nuclear deal).

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