After three years of war in Gaza and a brutal election campaign, Israelis went to the polls and — with tremendous fanfare — produced a stalemate. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc fell to roughly 53 seats in the Knesset out of 120 total, down from 68 in 2022, but the opposition, led by former general Gadi Eisenkot, likewise failed to reach the magic number of 61 seats to form a government. Both sides underperformed expectations, and the question now is whether Eisenkot and his partners break their campaign promise not to sit with Netanyahu in a unity government. If Eisenkot refuses to do so, the most likely outcome will be new elections.
Amid intense backroom dealing as both sides jockey to form a government, here are three things about the election that observers are misreading:
1. The election was not a verdict on who runs Israel.
Israelis do not vote for a prime minister. They vote for lists of parliamentary candidates, and the real contest — the negotiations between parties — starts after election day. Likud is still the largest party, but that does not give Netanyahu first dibs on forming a government. Eisenkot may well receive more Knesset Member recommendations to President Isaac Herzog, which is why the tone since Tuesday has been less “Bibi won” and more “who can get to 61.” The Arab parties, at a record 17 seats, are pivotal in this calculation, both both Netanyahu and Eisenkot have ruled out integrating them into a coalition given concerns about associating with anti-Zionist politics.
A lot of what drove the overall election result is demographic and structural: higher Arab turnout, which Bibi’s coalition attributes to Qatari influence (with little evidence), and a religious and right-leaning electorate that keeps growing. The result reflects a country that is evenly split, not one that has made a definitive choice.
2. The election will change Israel’s foreign policy.
It will not, because there is consensus among these parties on the basics of foreign policy. A majority of Israeli voters want a buffer against adversaries, believe the Iranian threat cannot be left to fester, and see no Palestinian state while Hamas is still in Gaza. They disagree on who is better placed to deliver this and who better protects Israel’s democratic identity. Eisenkot is a former military chief of staff, not a leftist dove. His coalition partners – Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman – come from hard right leaning parties. A new government would differ from the previous right-wing coalition mainly on tone and process, with fewer provocations, more attention to liberal democratic norms, and possibly a formal accountability commission for October 7, but not on fundamental policies.
3. Israeli politics is driving Trump’s decisions on Iran.
There are reports that Trump is deferring to Netanyahu on a strike to help him form a government, or to please pro-Israel US voters. This seems inaccurate. Trump has said he will not resume strikes before the November 3 midterms. Israeli media reported that Netanyahu repeatedly pressed Trump to strike before the Israeli election, and Trump rebuffed him. If Netanyahu’s electoral needs could not convince Trump then, it’s hard to see why they would now.
What explains the timing is Trump’s own problem. He reportedly shelved military options for economic pressure against Iran, then swung back, and strikes are now being discussed for as early as next weekend, right after the midterms. Trump wants to be done with Iran, and a strike is a seductive, if illusory way — as seen in previous attacks, to do so. However, Trump has failed to address the concerns of Gulf allies that renewed strikes would bring massive retaliation against their energy infrastructure. That challenge, more than anything unfolding in Jerusalem, could influence Trump’s decision.
Trump’s team is also quite public about intense negotiations with Iran, and some speculate Trump could announce an interim US-Iran deal before the midterms. This also seems fanciful: Iran has little incentive to cave to Trump in a rushed fashion, and the two sides remain dramatically apart. Iran struck more vessels in the Strait of Hormuz this past month than at any point during the conflict. Iran is not negotiating from a place of weakness, notwithstanding economic pressure. Trump could announce a deal, but it may not reflect the reality of negotiations.
What happens next
Israeli President Herzog will determine which leader gets the first shot at forming a government. That will take some time. Meanwhile, a third US aircraft carrier is steaming towards the Gulf. Israel’s elections were a significant development, but they are not the region-shaping event many believe them to be. Capstone will continue to monitor events in the Gulf this week.
Read more from Capstone’s Aerospace and Defense team:
Graham Russia Sanctions Bill: Hurdles, Impact and Questions
Running on Empty: The Prolonged Energy Market Fallout from the Iran War
Foreign Policy Heading into September: Sorting the Hype from the Real Shifts




























